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The Catholic Church unequivocally and rightfully condemns both physician-
assisted suicide (PAS) and euthanasia as grave violations of the moral law.' From 
the perspective of the patient, PAS and euthanasia exemplify morally equivalent 
actions as, in both cases, the moral object of the act is to destroy the basic good of 
one's life, to seek one's death for the ultimate purpose of ending suffering. 
Although a growing number of people in our society, including some moralists, 
would argue that such a course of action is ethically acceptable, I will presume that 
suicide represents an intrinsic and objective moral evil. Until recently, physicians 
trained in the Hippocratic tradition equally denounced and refused to participate 
in PAS and euthanasia. However, today more and more members of society and 
the medical community seem willing to accept PAS because it represents an 
exercise of the prized value of patient autonomy without requiring the immediate 
cooperation of the physician in the death.2 The physician can claim: "I wouldn't do 
this myself, but if the patients want to do this, it is their choice." People have a 
different "feel" about PAS than they do about euthanasia. To some proponents, 
PAS seems to be a lesser and justifiable evil - or not even an evil at all. As 
potential evidence of this, in November 1994, voters in Oregon approved a bill 
legalizing PAS but not euthanasia.3 Does this preference to allow PAS and to 
restrict euthanasia reflect a subtle but real moral distinction between the two 
actions insofar as physician cooperation is concerned? Or a political/legal 
expediency? Or a slippery slope concern? Or a psychologial discomfort? That is, 
does the distance created in PAS between the physician's action and the actual 
death of the patient legitimate physician cooperation? In its effort to protect the 
sanctity of life, the Catholic Church will need to attend more carefully to these 
purported differences between the two actions in order to demonstrate that any 
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type of intentional physician cooperation with the suicide of a patient is ethically 
untenable. 
Before proceeding, clarification of terms is necessary. In PAS, a physician 
supplies the means for a patient to commit suicide, knowing that the patient will 
use such means for the purpose of committing suicide. The physician may be more 
or less involved in the process ranging from being present at the suicide itself, to 
prescribing drugs, to providing information. This does not include the situation 
wherein the patient covertly accumulates medications unbeknownst to the 
physician until a sufficient amount of drugs is collected to commit suicide. 
Euthanasia involves an "action or omission which by itself or by intention causes 
death, in order that all suffering may in this way be eliminated."4 In euthanasia, the 
physician kills the patient while in PAS the doctor makes the death of the patient 
possible. The two actions differ physically by the extent of physician cooperation. 
This article will examine whether significant moral differences emerge from this 
physical distinction in light of the principle of cooperation. 
A Political/Legal Agenda 
The state of Oregon's choice to legalize only PAS clearly reflected a politically 
and legally astute approach to the issue. Previously, initiatives which allowed for 
both euthanasia and PAS had failed in Washington state and California.s 
Consequently, the writers of the bill in Oregon chose an incremental approach to 
passing legislation, learning from the mistakes of previous bills. In doing so, they 
reduced the chance of alienating voters. Voters would see the Oregon legislation as 
a moderate compromise between the two extremes of current law and legalized 
euthanasia. Additionally this approach offered a legal advantage because of the 
different legal sanctions against PAS versus euthanasia. All states have 
decriminalized suicide and only about thirty states have laws specifically against 
PAS. In contrast, euthanasia clearly would be illegal in all states in light of 
homicide laws.6 These pragmatic and legal distinctions do not necessarily 
demonstrate an intrinsic moral difference between the two actions insofar as 
cooperation is concerned. However, the distinctions in criminal penalties intimates 
that PAS is somehow a lesser crime and thereby a lesser evil. 
Concerns Over the Slippery Slope 
The decision to propose legislation aimed only at legalizing PAS also reflected a 
fear of the slippery slope. Concerns abound that if voluntary euthanasia were to be 
legalized, many abuses would follow.7 Slippery slope suspicions have been 
confirmed in recent studies of the great euthanasia social experiment in the 
Netherlands. Many physicians have euthanized people at one point or another 
without explicit consent from the patient.s 
Moreover, by taking the final decision and death-dealing action out of the hands 
of patients, the terminally ill may be coerced subtlly into euthanasia against their 
will by physicians or families.9 An action designed to promote autonomy could in 
fact compromise patient self-determination. Physicians would be viewed as 
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having too much power in an age when patients' rights groups struggle to curtail 
the power of the medical profession. Yet this cautionary approach of only 
legalizing PAS should not be interpreted necessarily as an assertion of an essential 
moral difference between the actions of PAS and euthanasia but more a reflection 
of the fear of resultant consequences. Many proponents believe that physicians 
theoretically could perform acts of euthanasia in a morally acceptable manner. 
They simply reject legalization or widespread use of euthanasia at this time 
because of the lack of enforceable and appropriate safeguards to guarantee patient 
sovereignty. In this sense, one could argue that PAS represents a lesser evil because 
of the diminished potential for abuse. However, this does not justify cooperation 
with the action. It merely indicates that with euthanasia, one has traversed farther 
down the slippery slope. I 
Interestingly, this consequentialist concern about the slippery slope is in theory 
yielding to the persuasiveness oflogical consistency. Specifically, if one determines 
that patients have a right to be assisted in death and they desire this assistance, then 
logically and perhaps legally, it would be discriminatory not to kill those who are 
incapable of committing suicide because they lack the physical or psychological 
wherewithal to do so. In a recent article advocating the legalization of both assisted 
suicide and euthanasia, two of its authors, Timothy Quill and Diane Meier, 
utilized this type of reasoning in reversing their own restrictive conclusions from 
only two years previous.lO 
The Psychological and Moral Nuances 
Political, legal, and slippery slope concerns provide credible reasons for the 
public and the medical profession to embrace PAS more readily than euthanasia. 
Yet, I contend that a more critical element in this debate is related to the lack of 
psychological comfort associated with direct complicity in another person's death. 
This in turn has generated an apparent moral difference between the two actions in 
the minds of many people. 
A recent study of physicians in Washington state reveals the potential 
psychological distinction. lI The survey indicated that 42% of physicians believed 
there were times when euthanasia would be ethically justified but only 33% would 
actually commit an act of euthanasia if it were legalized. 50% indicated that PAS is 
ethical in some situations and 40% stated their willingness to assist patients in 
suicide. Of course, one cannot say for sure if a physician would follow through on 
an opinion given in a survey. However, the numbers reveal two important insights. 
First, the number of physicians who cognitively believe in the ethical 
acceptability of euthanasia and assisted suicide is higher than the number who 
would perform such actions. This suggests that there may be deep down 
psychological concerns about cooperating in the killing of innocent patients. In 
fact, the general public's push to medicalize death by embracing PAS and 
euthanasia reflects a reluctance on the part of patients and their families to be 
involved directly in the killing. They want others to do it for them. Certainly, part 
of the call for the medical sanitation of suicide sterns from fears of "botched" 
suicide attempts. But it also undoubtedly reveals a desire to distance oneself from 
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killing. How many people would feel comfortable boasting: "I killed Mom?" 
Second, the lower percentage associated with performing acts of euthanasia 
vis-a-vis PAS suggests that the more directly involved one is in the killing, the 
more reticent one becomes. Amending a previous policy, the Royal Dutch 
Medical Association recently indicated that it would be better for patients to 
kill themselves with physician aid rather than have physicians euthanize the 
patients. Although still allowing for cases of euthanasia, the policy revision 
reflects a recognition that euthanasia seems more at odds with the doctor's role 
as a healer than PAS. Dr. Robert Dillman of the association's ethics 
commission stated that: 
Many doctors find euthanasia an extremely difficult and burdensome action, and the 
patient's participation diminishes this burden slightly. In the past we said that all 
things being equal, there was no difference between mercy killing and assisted suicide. 
But in practice, doctors say this is not the same, that there is a difference . .. Doctors 
regularly signal that they prefer the patient to do it if possible.12 
Association representatives go on to explain that the new emphasis on patient 
responsibility flowed from a desire to relieve physicians of the emotional stress 
associated with acts of mercy killing. 
The psychological considerations point to an issue which has a rich tradition 
in Catholic moral theology: cooperation with evil. 13 In some people's minds, a 
sufficient distance from the evil action may legitimate cooperation in its 
performance. Thus, some people ask if a physician for good reason can 
cooperate licitly when assisting with suicide as opposed to performing an act of 
euthanasia? To answer this question clearly and with the appropriate 
distinctions is not merely an esoteric, hair-splitting academic question. Sadly, 
in Oregon and the Netherlands, physicians, legislators, and the public have 
already demonstrated a greater willingness to cooperate with PAS. This 
indicates that psychological perceptions produce some type of moral 
difference in the minds of individuals. In our overly individualistic society, 
physicians and other health care professionals may be persuaded to cooperate 
with morally distasteful actions under the guise of respecting patient 
autonomy. Because one does not directly end the life of the patient, people 
believe cooperation with suicide is exonerated. Robert Weir asserts that: 
the intentional killing of patients is not the ethical issue involved in PAS. Physicians 
do not cause the death of patients in these cases; the patients cause their own deaths .. . 
critics of PAS who assert that physicians are thereby killing patients are either a) 
mistaken about the differences between assisted suicide and voluntary euthanasia or 
b) intentionally blurring the differences between these two acts to score points with 
the emotive language of "killing."14 
Therefore, it behooves us to recognize and acknowledge the distinctions which 
people articulate between the two actions. However, do these distinctions 
validate one practice over the other? I would assert they do not. But we must be 
careful to utilize the appropriate ethical distinctions in order to demonstrate 
the moral turpitude of both actions for health care professionals. 
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Catholic Approaches 
Insofar as the Catholic Church has taught on this matter, minimal attention has 
been given to potential nuances in the evaluation of euthanasia and assisted suicide 
which arise from the difference in their physical natures. In Evangelium vitae, Pope . 
John Paul II distinguishes between the two in terms of their physical reality but 
does not in terms of their essential moral character. The pope's specific declaration 
of condemnation of euthanasia does not include assisted suicide per se. However, 
when read in context, John Paul II suggests an equal condemnation of assisted 
suicide as an "injustice which can never be excused even if requested."l5 The New 
Catechism of the Catholic Church does not make any clear moral distinction 
between PAS and euthanasia. l6 Theologians like Richard Gula have stated that 
PAS "is not morally different from euthanasia and need not be distinguished for 
purposes of understanding the moral vision and values at stake in the present 
debate."l7 Physician/ethicist Leon Kass reflects traditional Catholic opinion on 
the matter by arguing that by assisting the patient with suicide, the physician "is as 
much in violation of the venerable proscription against euthanasia as were the 
physician to do it himself."l8 However, I would maintain that a proper and 
thorough critique and condemnation of these two actions requires a more nuanced 
evaluation grounded in the principle of cooperation. That is, euthanasia and 
assisted suicide require two different types of physical and moral cooperation by 
the physician. Nevertheless, I hope to demonstrate that neither type of cooperation 
is acceptable. 
Cooperation With Evil 
A t times in life, people cooperate with evil. The taxpayer in performing a good 
action (paying taxes) may simultaneously financially support the corrupt and evil 
practices of a government. Of course, one implicitly presumes that if one could 
discover a reasonable and accessible path to achieve the good effect without 
cooperating with the evil, one would be required to do so. Consequently, one 
initially presumes that cooperation with evil is illicit until proven otherwise. 
However, like the case of the taxpayer who risks going to jail for non-payment of 
taxes, there may be times when cooperation is required because of some type of 
external duress or constraint. 
Cooperation with evil can be divided into formal and material cooperation. 
Formal cooperation occurs when one concurs or agrees with the proximate sinful 
intention of the principal agent. That is, the cooperator believes that the "evil" 
means employed by the wrongdoer to accomplish his ultimate purpose is 
acceptable or legitimate. As such, formal cooperation is always wrong. However, 
instances arise when one disagrees with the intention of the evil doer yet somehow 
materially contributes to the performance of the evil act. Moralists term this type of 
cooperation as material. Material cooperation can be subdivided into immediate 
and mediate material cooperation. 
Immediate cooperation requires direct participation in the commission of the 
sinful action itself.l9 Traditionally, a person may not immediately cooperate with 
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the principal agent or evil doer particularly when the moral object of the 
cooperator's action is intrinsically evil,2° For example, this is why Catholic health 
care facilities have been prohibited from performing contraceptive sterilizations.21 
On the other hand, actions which only lead up to or supply the means necessary 
for the wrongdoer to perform the immoral action constitute mediate material 
cooperation. Mediate material cooperation can be proximate or remote depending 
upon the proximity of the cooperator to the evil action. The determination of 
proximity relies on the prudential estimation of the cooperator based on a variety 
of sources including magisterial teaching, the moral manuals and experience. In 
addition, cooperation can be necessary or contingent. Necessary cooperation 
implies that the evil action would not occur were it not for the assistance of the 
cooperator. Contingent cooperation suggests that the person intending the evil 
action could easily enlist the help of other cooperators in order to accomplish the 
evil deed. 
The principle of cooperation acknowledges that certain types of mediate 
material cooperation may be tolerated under limited circumstances. In order for 
mediate material cooperation to be morally acceptable, there must be sufficient 
justification in terms of the good achieved or evil avoided which results from 
cooperation. In addition, the goods achieved or evils avoided must be extrinsic to 
the salutary effects of the evil action. That is, the good achieved should not flow 
directly from the evil action. Otherwise one directly violates the principle of 
double effect in using the evil effect to achieve the good which automatically 
renders such cooperation as illicit.22 
The norms of material cooperation also require that one do all that is possible to 
prevent the evil action or to minimize one's cooperation. Finally, cooperation in 
evil must avoid scandal which might weaken the faith of believers by diminishing 
the authority and authenticity of a particular Church teaching. 
Clearly, as the cooperation becomes more proximate and necessary, and the 
evil with which one cooperates becomes more serious, a greater extrinsic 
justification is required in order to cooperate. For very close cooperation, a very 
grave cause would be required. If an evil is so great, there may be cases when no 
extrinsic reason justifies any type of proximate cooperation. The classic example of 
this involves any proximate mediate material cooperation with direct abortions.23 
Applying the Principle to PAS and Euthanasia 
Today, many physicians sadly believe PAS and euthanasia are morally 
acceptable means to relieve suffering and would be willing to cooperate with such 
evils. Such cooperation is formal cooperation and is always morally unacceptable. 
However, in applying the principle of cooperation in this article, I am considering 
only the case of when a physician has concluded that euthanasia and PAS are 
inappropriate means to relieve suffering, yet asks: "To what extent may I 
cooperate with an action (causing the death of the patient) which I feel is wrong, 
but one which my patient nevertheless desires?" If there were no greater extrinsic 
good to be achieved or evil to be avoided through cooperation, then cooperation 
with evil is automatically proscribed. That is, one has an obligation to avoid even 
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material cooperation with evil unless under constraint to cooperate. A physician 
cannot say that he or she isjust carrying out the patient's wishes. One has aprima 
facie obligation not to assist evil. One might argue that offering "aid in dying" 
provides an important extrinsic good, the protection of patient autonomy or 
freedom. However, this assertion reflects a corrupt understanding of autonomy 
and freedom. The patient's choice of suicide has never been recognized in Catholic 
teaching as an exercise of freedom but an abuse of it. The fact that a patient desires 
assistance in dying in no way warrants its provision based on the longstanding 
principle of cooperation, precisely because there seemingly is no justifiable reason 
to cooperate (i.e., a great good achieved or evil avoided through cooperation). 
Consequently, much of the psychological and moral relief generated by the more 
ready acceptance of PAS over against euthanasia is illusory. 
However, could there be situations wherein an external constraint exists which 
might require a further application of the principle of cooperation? Given efforts to 
legalize PAS and euthanasia, one could imagine "aid in dying" as standard 
medical provision expected by patients and health care plans in the years to come. 
The physician's ability to practice medicine might be hampered if one were not 
able to offer these "services." This at least in theory would provide an extrinsic 
cause for cooperation. 
In euthanasia, the physician would directly participate in the evil action. This 
would constitute at least immediate material cooperation and would be a sharing 
in an intrinsically evil moral object. Some would say this actually involves implicit 
formal cooperation. The physician and patient would share the same moral object 
albeit for different remote intentions.24 However, in accord with Veritatis splendor, 
one may not perform an instrinsically evil action regardless of circumstances or 
remote intention.25 Therefore, the principle of cooperation would prohibit any act 
of euthanasia on the part of the physician. 
Some might argue that PAS likewise would involve immediate cooperation; 
however, the physician would not be directly involved in the commission of the 
evil act of killing but merely would contribute to the death. Therefore, it would 
involve proximate mediate material cooperation. For example, John McHugh 
and Charles Callan briefly refer to the selling of poison or drugs to one who 
contemplates suicide.26 The physician would recognize that in prescribing the 
drug, the patient mayor may not use the medication. The degree of proximity of 
the cooperation would depend upon whether the physician merely prescribed the 
drug or is present at the suicide. The cooperation would more likely be contingent, 
although this would depend upon availability of physicians practicing PAS in the 
future. The physician presumably would have made every effort to alleviate the 
suffering of the patient with moral means and tried to persuade the patient not to 
commit such an immoral act. Given this type of cooperation, would there be a 
justifying cause extrinsic to the purpose of the evil act? As in the case of euthanasia, 
one cannot justify cooperation with PAS because it relieves the suffering of the 
patient. Such argumentation would invoke the utilization of immoral means to 
achieve a good end. This would always be unethical. Nor could one justify 
cooperation on the basis of carrying out patient wishes because one would have a 
primary obligation not to cooperate with evil unless constrained to do so. 
May, 1996 37 
Let us return then to the possibility of a future in which PAS might become 
common practice wherein refusal to cooperate would threaten the job of the 
physician. In such a context, the extrinsic good achieved (maintaining the 
physician's practice) would pale in comparison with the evil which would result, 
the direct killing of innocent human life. Cooperation with PAS would be more 
akin to prescribing RU-486 (if or when it becomes marketed) for abortive 
purposes. Consequently, even though proximate mediate material cooperation 
can occur for a sufficiently grave cause, no such cause would exist in this case. 
Given the gravity of the evil with which one would cooperate, the lack of a 
concomitant and proportionate extrinsic justification, and the proximity to the 
evil, PAS could never be justified as an acceptable practice. The reasons for the 
unacceptability of PAS in comparison with euthanasia differ in light of the 
application of the principle of cooperation. Nevertheless, direct physician 
participation in suicide always remains gravely wrong regardless of its legal or 
societal acceptability. Furthermore, material cooperation with PAS and 
euthanasia would be proscribed because of the potential of grave scandal. 
Cooperation in these practices by physicians would give credence to their practice, 
implying that suicide was an acceptable moral response to terminal illness and 
suffering. 
Finally, other health care professionals like nurses who might be asked to be 
involved proximately in "aid in dying" could not do so (even if their job were at 
risk) because ofthe magnitude ofthe evil involved. Even more remote cooperation 
such as referring a patient to a colleague who would offer "aid in dying" would 
likewise be unacceptable. Very distant and remote cooperation would have to be 
scrutinized carefully (e.g., working in a hospital where such practices like 
euthanasia were carried out). As such, the analysis appears quite similar to the 
Church's longstanding teaching on cooperation with abortion. 
Conclusion 
Most ethical analyses have inadvertently lumped together the issues of PAS and 
euthanasia. Yet even from a physical perspective, one is an act of killing, the other 
makes possible the death. In addition, the law in its distinction of crimes and 
penalties between suicide and murder, legislative approaches to legalizing PAS, 
and the general psychological perceptions of the two acts suggest an existential 
difference between the two deadly realities. Many people feel less repugnance at 
merely giving people the ability to exercise their autonomy - it's the American 
way! Physicians and other health care professionals may be enticed to support 
PAS rather than euthanasia precisely because they are not directly involved in the 
deadly deed. It seems like a "lesser evil." Nevertheless, it is an evil- a grave evil! 
The longstanding -Catholic teaching on cooperation with evil provides the 
necessary and nuanced theoretical approach which demonstrates the moral 
illicitness of cooperating with either euthanasia or PAS. The physical distance 
created between the physician's action and the patient's death does not excuse its 
practices. 
Much is at stake in this debate, even beyond the tragic destruction of life. The 
38 Linacre Quarterly 
contemporary societal movement towards the acceptance of PAS will irreversibly 
pervert the nature of the physician/patient relationship. Additionally, 
participation in PAS will dull the ethical senses of physicians, eventually removing 
the last vestiges of inhibition to immediate cooperation with killing in euthanasia. 
Primarily, in order to counter this attraction to PAS and euthanasia, John Paul II 
has insisted that we take steps to provide appropriate care for dying patients in 
order to mute the voices calling for such deadly actions.27 But secondarily, after 
acknowledging the intrinsic evil of suicide and euthanasia, one must utilize the 
classic principle of cooperation to demonstrate that PAS is no more morally 
acceptable than euthanasia. In creating this nuanced argument, one recognizes that 
people may have a "different feel" about PAS, but this would not justify 
cooperation with an action which merely serves to perpetuate a culture of death. 
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